OSHA COMPLIANCE JHA

Movie Hazard Analysis

TASK / OPERATION	LOCATION
Cargo Loader Airlock Emergency	Aliens (1986) — Power Loader vs. Queen at Open

JOB TITLE(S)
Cargo Loader Operator (1), Alien Queen (1)

TASK / OPERATION DESCRIPTION
A Cargo Loader Operator uses a heavy hydraulic power-loader exoskeleton to battle an Alien Queen near an open airlock leading to open space, with the fight ending in the creature being ejected through the opening.

DATE JHA PREPARED	SUPERVISOR(S)
Oct 10, 2026	*Not provided*

JHA TEAM MEMBERS
Not provided

STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 1 Stop work and assess the cargo bay, airlock, loader condition, and immediate threat before approaching. Potential Injury: Fatal vacuum exposure, ejection, impact injuries, or biological trauma.	- Open airlock exposes the operator and second worker to vacuum and possible ejection. - Structural damage or decompression may make the cargo bay unstable or unsafe to enter. - The described biological threat may injure workers who approach without a verified exclusion plan.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Do not enter the threatened cargo bay while the airlock is open or structural integrity is uncertain. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use only a verified remotely operable airlock closure or pressure-restoration system if available [ ] - do not assume one exists. [ ] Administrative controls - The supervisor accounts for both workers [ ] - establishes communication and an exclusion boundary [ ] - and verifies pressure and structural status before authorizing entry. Stop work if conditions change. [ ] Personal protective equipment - No PPE listed	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

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STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 2 Confirm the hydraulic power-loader exoskeleton is suitable for use and inspect its controls and mechanical condition before operating it. Potential Injury: Crush injuries, fractures, amputation, or fatal ejection.	- Unexpected movement or hydraulic failure of the heavy power-loader can crush or trap the operator or nearby worker. - Damaged or unresponsive controls can cause unintended movement near the open airlock.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Do not operate the loader if inspection identifies a defect or if the airlock danger zone cannot be isolated. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use only the loader's verified guarding [ ] - restraint [ ] - and emergency-stop functions [ ] - their presence and operation must be confirmed before use. [ ] Administrative controls - A qualified operator performs and documents the equipment-specific pre-use inspection and control-function check. Keep the second worker outside the loader movement zone. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Use only the operator protective equipment specified by the loader manufacturer and vessel procedure - details are not supplied.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided
Step 3 Coordinate the two-worker response and establish separation between the loader operating zone and the open airlock. Potential Injury: Crush injury, impact injury, fall or ejection into open space, or fatal vacuum exposure.	- The second worker may enter the loader's movement path or airlock fall/ejection zone during the operation. - Noise, restricted visibility, or structural damage may prevent the operator and second worker from communicating.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Keep the second worker out of the cargo bay and airlock danger zone during loader movement unless a separately verified role requires entry. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use installed barriers or physical separation only if verified suitable for the damaged-area conditions. [ ] Administrative controls - Before operation [ ] - the supervisor assigns operator and support roles [ ] - confirms a communication method and stop signal [ ] - and verifies both workers' locations. Stop if contact is lost. [ ] Personal protective equipment - worker protective equipment and vessel requirements are not provided.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

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STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 4 Operate the power-loader only within a controlled movement area and avoid directing force toward the open airlock. Potential Injury: Fatal ejection or vacuum exposure, crush injuries, fractures, or blunt-force trauma.	- Loader movement or impact near the open airlock can cause the operator, another worker, or cargo-bay materials to be ejected. - Hydraulic equipment movement can crush or strike a worker or damage the vessel structure.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Do not operate the loader toward the airlock or continue if a safe movement area cannot be maintained. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use verified loader movement limits and vessel barriers only if installed [ ] - functional [ ] - and suitable for the conditions. [ ] Administrative controls - The operator uses controlled movements and stops on loss of control [ ] - unexpected resistance [ ] - structural movement [ ] - or entry of another person into the movement zone. The supervisor authorizes any change in operation. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Use manufacturerand vessel-specified operator protection only after requirements and fit are confirmed - details are not supplied.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided
Step 5 Do not intentionally eject the creature through the open airlock unless a separately authorized emergency plan verifies the action and protects both workers. Potential Injury: Fatal ejection or vacuum exposure, crush injury, or traumatic injury.	- Forcing a biological threat toward the opening places the operator and support worker near a fatal ejection and vacuum-exposure zone. - Impact or struggle at the opening may damage the airlock boundary or destabilize the cargo bay.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Do not approach or use the loader to propel the creature through the opening under this draft. Engineering controls (Existing?) - No protective engineering method is specified [ ] - do not rely on an unverified barrier or airlock mechanism. [ ] Administrative controls - Stop and transfer the situation to the vessel’s designated emergency authority. Resume only under a verified [ ] - authorized response plan with confirmed worker locations and airlock safeguards. [ ] Personal protective equipment - No PPE listed	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

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STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 6 After the threat is no longer present, stop and secure the loader, account for both workers, and verify the cargo bay and airlock status before release. Potential Injury: Crush injury, fatal vacuum exposure or ejection, and possible injury from unidentified biological contamination .	- Unsecured hydraulic equipment may move unexpectedly during shutdown or after the operator dismounts. - Unverified airlock or structural condition may expose workers to vacuum, ejection, or collapse during closeout. - The prompt does not identify whether biological material or other contamination remains in the cargo bay.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Do not enter for cleanup or recovery until the threat, airlock, pressure condition, and structural status are verified. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Park and secure the loader using its verified manufacturer procedure [ ] - use airlock or pressure-control systems only after their condition is confirmed. [ ] Administrative controls - The operator follows the equipment shutdown procedure [ ] - the supervisor accounts for both workers [ ] - records defects or damage [ ] - and releases the area only after authorized inspection. Treat unknown biological residue as substance unspecified and do not handle it without an approved assessment. [ ] Personal protective equipment - No cleanup PPE can be specified from the supplied information - identify the residue and consult applicable vessel procedures before handling.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Initial Risk: HIGH -> Residual Risk: HIGH | Risk reduction demonstrated across all steps.

Step	Description	Hazard	Controls	Initial Risk	Residual Risk
1	Stop work and assess the cargo bay, airlock, loader condition, and immediate threat before approaching.	- Open airlock exposes the operator and second worker to vacuum and possible ejection. - Structural damage or decompression may make the cargo bay unstable or unsafe to enter. - The described biological threat may injure workers who approach without a verified exclusion plan.	- Use only a verified remotely operable airlock closure or pressure-restoration system if available - do not assume one exists. - The supervisor accounts for both workers - establishes communication and an exclusion boundary	**15 - High**	**10 - High**

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2	Confirm the hydraulic power-loader exoskeleton is suitable for use and inspect its controls and mechanical condition before operating it.	- Unexpected movement or hydraulic failure of the heavy power-loader can crush or trap the operator or nearby worker. - Damaged or unresponsive controls can cause unintended movement near the open airlock.	- Use only the loader's verified guarding - restraint - and emergency-stop functions - their presence and operation must be confirmed before use.	**15 - High**	**10 - High**
3	Coordinate the two-worker response and establish separation between the loader operating zone and the open airlock.	- The second worker may enter the loader's movement path or airlock fall/ejection zone during the operation. - Noise, restricted visibility, or structural damage may prevent the operator and second worker from communicating.	- Use installed barriers or physical separation only if verified suitable for the damaged-area conditions. - Before operation - the supervisor assigns operator and support roles - confirms a communication method and stop signal	**15 - High**	**10 - High**
4	Operate the power-loader only within a controlled movement area and avoid directing force toward the open airlock.	- Loader movement or impact near the open airlock can cause the operator, another worker, or cargo-bay materials to be ejected. - Hydraulic equipment movement can crush or strike a worker or damage the vessel structure.	- Use verified loader movement limits and vessel barriers only if installed - functional - and suitable for the conditions. - The operator uses controlled movements and stops on loss of control	**15 - High**	**10 - High**
5	Do not intentionally eject the creature through the open airlock unless a separately authorized emergency plan verifies the action and protects both workers.	- Forcing a biological threat toward the opening places the operator and support worker near a fatal ejection and vacuum-exposure zone. - Impact or struggle at the opening may damage the airlock boundary or destabilize the cargo bay.	- No protective engineering method is specified - do not rely on an unverified barrier or airlock mechanism. - Stop and transfer the situation to the vessel's designated emergency authority. Resume only under a verified - authorized response plan with confirmed worker locations and airlock safeguards.	**15 - High**	**10 - High**

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6	After the threat is no longer present, stop and secure the loader, account for both workers, and verify the cargo bay and airlock status before release.	- Unsecured hydraulic equipment may move unexpectedly during shutdown or after the operator dismounts. - Unverified airlock or structural condition may expose workers to vacuum, ejection, or collapse during closeout. - The prompt does not identify whether biological material or other contamination remains in the cargo bay.	- Park and secure the loader using its verified manufacturer procedure - use airlock or pressure-control systems only after their condition is confirmed. - The operator follows the equipment shutdown procedure - the supervisor accounts for both workers	**10 - High**	**5 - Medium**

Civilian risk levels: 1-4 Low, 5-9 Medium, 10-15 High, 16-25 Critical. Initial Risk = hazard risk before controls applied. Residual Risk = remaining risk after controls applied. Effective JHA demonstrates residual risk lower than initial risk on all steps.

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