OSHA COMPLIANCE JHA

Movie Hazard Analysis

TASK / OPERATION	LOCATION
Firebase Assault Exposure Response	Platoon (1986) — Firebase Night Assault

JOB TITLE(S)
Infantry Soldier (30), Platoon Commander (1), Forward Air Controller (1)

TASK / OPERATION DESCRIPTION
An infantry unit's firebase perimeter is overrun during a nighttime assault, with heavy small-arms fire and mortar impacts, culminating in an airstrike called in danger-close to friendly positions.

DATE JHA PREPARED	SUPERVISOR(S)
Sep 24, 2026	*Not provided*

JHA TEAM MEMBERS
Not provided

STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 1 Recognize the perimeter overrun and account for personnel from available cover. Potential Injury: Fatal or life-threatening penetrating wounds, blast trauma, fragmentation injuries, and falls during movement.	- Nighttime assault and low visibility impair recognition of incoming fire, terrain hazards, and movement of the 32-person unit. - Heavy small-arms fire and mortar impacts can cause penetrating trauma, blast injury, and fragmentation injuries.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Do not expose personnel to the active impact area for routine work; withdraw or shelter in the best available cover when directed by the unit leader. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use only existing cover identified by the unit leader [ ] - do not assume that vegetation [ ] - improvised barriers [ ] - or structures stop bullets or fragments. [ ] Administrative controls - Unit leader gives concise [ ] - audible orders and headcounts [ ] - assign buddy accountability and communicate designated movement routes and rally points. Stop nonessential work and defer this JHA sequence if the assault prevents controlled execution. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Wear issued ballistic helmet and body armor - use eye protection compatible with issued equipment.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.

STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 2 Move only when directed, using the leader-designated route through jungle terrain. Potential Injury: Fatal or life-threatening ballistic or blast injuries; fractures, sprains, and lacerations from falls or collisions.	- Moving through jungle terrain at night during small-arms fire and mortar impacts exposes personnel to fire, fragmentation, trips, and falls. - Uncoordinated movement by a 32-person unit can cause separation, collisions, or entry into an unverified route.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Avoid nonessential movement through the exposed perimeter while fire or impacts continue. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use existing terrain or structures as cover only after the unit leader identifies them [ ] - no supplied detail confirms their protective capability. [ ] Administrative controls - Unit leader assigns movement order [ ] - route [ ] - pace [ ] - and rally point [ ] - maintain buddy contact and headcounts. Pause movement if visibility [ ] - route [ ] - or unit accountability is lost [ ] - and obtain leader direction before resuming. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Wear issued ballistic helmet and body armor - use eye protection compatible with issued equipment.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.

STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 3 Coordinate the danger-close airstrike through the authorized command channel. Potential Injury: Fatal blast, fragmentation, crush, burn, or blunt-force injuries.	- A danger-close airstrike near friendly positions creates risk of blast overpressure, fragmentation, structural or terrain debris, and fatal misidentification or friendly-fire injury. - Nighttime visibility and ongoing small-arms and mortar fire can impair location confirmation and communication.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Keep personnel out of the designated strike area where operationally possible; do not treat a danger-close strike as routine work or proceed without command direction. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use only existing cover selected by the unit leader [ ] - do not assume it can withstand an airstrike. No blast protection or shelter configuration is supplied. [ ] Administrative controls - Only the authorized military decision-maker requests [ ] - approves [ ] - or adjusts the strike. Confirm friendly-position information and communicate the designated warning [ ] - timing [ ] - and protective action through the established command channel [ ] - acknowledge receipt and account for personnel when operationally possible. If location or communication is uncertain [ ] - report the uncertainty to the decision-maker and do not independently alter targeting information. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Wear issued ballistic helmet and body armor - these do not assure protection against airstrike blast or fragmentation.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.

STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 4 Maintain essential communication and hearing protection during weapons fire and impacts. Potential Injury: Temporary or permanent hearing loss, tinnitus, and missed or misunderstood commands leading to further injury.	- Small-arms and mortar fire and the airstrike produce extreme noise that can cause acute hearing injury and interfere with critical command communication. - Explosions may produce impulse noise beyond the protection provided by available hearing protectors.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Avoid unnecessary proximity to firing and impact locations when operationally feasible. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use existing cover to reduce exposure only when the unit leader directs and its location does not increase other hazards [ ] - no noise-reduction performance is supplied. [ ] Administrative controls - Unit leader confirms a workable method for critical orders to be received and acknowledged [ ] - do not delay immediate protective action to obtain hearing protection. After the event [ ] - arrange assessment for personnel reporting hearing symptoms or blast exposure. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Use issued hearing protection if immediately available and if it does not prevent receipt of essential commands or required warning signals.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.

STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 5 Limit avoidable exposure to smoke and combustion byproducts. Potential Injury: Acute respiratory irritation or poisoning, headache, dizziness, impaired judgment, loss of consciousness, or other toxic effects; repeated lead exposure can cause systemic harm.	- Smoke and combustion byproducts from sustained weapons fire and nearby explosions may be inhaled, including carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, airborne combustion particles, and potentially lead-containing firearm emissions or residues. - The prompt does not establish the specific ammunition, combustion conditions, concentration, or duration of an individual's exposure.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Move away from visible smoke or combustion plume when movement is operationally feasible and does not expose personnel to greater immediate danger. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Use existing upwind or less smoke-affected cover if the unit leader can identify it without increasing exposure to fire [ ] - no ventilation system or verified clean-air location is supplied. [ ] Administrative controls - Unit leader observes for confusion [ ] - headache [ ] - dizziness [ ] - breathing difficulty [ ] - or collapse and seeks prompt medical evaluation when feasible. After exposure [ ] - obtain substance and ammunition information if available [ ] - no offline OEL match was found for combustion particulate matter [ ] - so verify applicable SDS or regulatory information when identifiable. Do not use this JHA to infer measured exposure or adequacy. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Do not assume a respirator is available or suitable for unknown combustion mixtures - use only respiratory protection specifically authorized and fit-tested for the user and applicable hazard - without delaying immediate protective action.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.

STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 6 Restrict access and defer closeout until the affected area is assessed. Potential Injury: Fatal or life-threatening blast, fragmentation, crush, or traumatic injuries.	- After the assault and airstrike, unexploded or delayed explosive hazards and damaged terrain or debris may injure personnel moving through the affected jungle perimeter. - Smoke, poor visibility, and continued or changed combat conditions may conceal hazards and impede a reliable closeout.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Do not conduct routine cleanup or closeout in an area not released by the responsible authority. Engineering controls (Existing?) - Establish a marked boundary around the area designated as hazardous by the responsible military authority [ ] - do not disturb suspected explosive items or debris. [ ] Administrative controls - Unit leader maintains accountability [ ] - restricts entry [ ] - and requests assessment by personnel authorized for explosive hazards. Re-enter or release the perimeter only on designated authority's direction [ ] - stop and report suspected hazards or renewed fire. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Continue issued ballistic helmet and body armor while in the affected area - they do not assure protection from unexploded ordnance.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

CHEMICAL EXPOSURE OEL SUMMARY (4)

OEL source priority: U.S. OSHA, NIOSH, ACGIH, and state sources first; then other available sources. The lowest available numeric OEL from matching offline sources is listed in addition to the location/default OEL. Confirm chemical identity and exposure limits against the SDS, label, and applicable regulations.

Lead and inorganic compounds (as Pb) (CAS: 7439-92-1, confidence: 90%)

Detected as: inhalation or ingestion of lead-containing firearm emissions and residues during small-arms fire
Location/default OEL: NIOSH REL TWA (8-hour) 0.050 mg/m3 [*Note: The PEL also applies to other lead compounds (as Pb) -- see Appendix C.]
Lowest available OEL: China GBZ TWA 0.03 mg/m³
Sources cited: NIOSH REL (TWA (8-hour) 0.050 mg/m3 [*Note: The PEL also applies to other lead compounds (as Pb) -- see Appendix C.]); Michigan MIOSHA (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Oregon OSHA (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Washington WISHA (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); China GBZ (TWA 0.03 mg/m³); Japan JSOH (TWA 0.03 mg/m³); 🇨🇦 British Columbia WorkSafeBC (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); 🇨🇦 Ontario MOL (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Australia WES (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Chile DS 594 (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); China GBZ (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Finland FIOH (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Germany TRGS 900 (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Mexico NOM-010-STPS (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); New Zealand WES (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Singapore PEL (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); South Korea OEL (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Sweden AV (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Taiwan PEL (TWA 0.05 mg/m³); Brazil NR-15 (TWA 0.1 mg/m³); France VLEP (TWA 0.1 mg/m³); Sweden AV (TWA 0.1 mg/m³); India Factories Act (TWA 0.15 mg/m³); Ireland HSA (TWA 0.15 mg/m³); Netherlands SER (TWA 0.15 mg/m³)

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.

Carbon monoxide (CAS: 630-08-0, confidence: 86%)

Detected as: inhalation of combustion gases from sustained weapons fire and nearby explosions
Location/default OEL: OSHA PEL TWA 50.0 ppm (55.0 mg/m³)
Lowest available OEL: China GBZ TWA 20 mg/m³
Sources cited: OSHA PEL (TWA 50.0 ppm (55.0 mg/m³)); NIOSH REL (TWA 50 ppm (55 mg/m3)); Hawaii HIOSH (TWA 35 ppm (40 mg/m³)); Michigan MIOSHA (TWA 35 ppm (40 mg/m³)); Oregon OSHA (TWA 50 ppm (55 mg/m³)); Washington WISHA (TWA 35 ppm); China GBZ (TWA 20 mg/m³); Finland FIOH (TWA 20 ppm (23 mg/m³)); France VLEP (TWA 20 ppm (23 mg/m³)); Ireland HSA (TWA 20 ppm (23 mg/m³)); Netherlands SER (TWA 20 ppm (23 mg/m³)); New Zealand WES (TWA 20 ppm); Sweden AV (TWA 20 ppm (23 mg/m³)); United Kingdom WEL (TWA 20 ppm (23 mg/m³)); 🇨🇦 British Columbia WorkSafeBC (TWA 25.0 ppm); 🇨🇦 Ontario MOL (TWA 25.0 ppm); Germany TRGS 900 (TWA 25 ppm (29 mg/m³)); Mexico NOM-010-STPS (TWA 25 ppm (29 mg/m³)); Singapore PEL (TWA 25 ppm (29 mg/m³)); South Korea OEL (TWA 25 ppm (29 mg/m³)); Taiwan PEL (TWA 25 ppm (29 mg/m³)); Australia WES (TWA 30 ppm (35 mg/m³)); 🇨🇦 Quebec CNESST (TWA 35.0 ppm); Brazil NR-15 (TWA 39 ppm (43 mg/m³)); Chile DS 594 (TWA 44 ppm (48 mg/m³)); India Factories Act (TWA 50.0 ppm (55.0 mg/m³)); Japan JSOH (TWA 50 ppm (57 mg/m³)); Kenya OEL (TWA 50 ppm (55 mg/m³)); South Africa HCA OEL (TWA 50 ppm)

Particulate matter from explosive and propellant combustion (CAS: Not listed, confidence: 85%)

Detected as: inhalation of airborne smoke and combustion particles during weapons fire and explosions
Location/default OEL: No offline OEL match found
Sources cited: No offline OEL source matched

Nitrogen dioxide (CAS: 10102-44-0, confidence: 78%)

Detected as: inhalation of combustion products from weapons fire, mortar impacts, and airstrike
Location/default OEL: OSHA PEL Ceiling 5.0 ppm (9.0 mg/m³)
Lowest available OEL: Mexico NOM-010-STPS TWA 0.2 ppm (0.38 mg/m³)
Sources cited: OSHA PEL (Ceiling 5.0 ppm (9.0 mg/m³)); NIOSH REL (STEL 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m3)); Hawaii HIOSH (STEL 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Michigan MIOSHA (TWA 3 ppm (6 mg/m³)); Oregon OSHA (TWA 5 ppm (9 mg/m³)); Washington WISHA (STEL 1 ppm); Mexico NOM-010-STPS (TWA 0.2 ppm (0.38 mg/m³)); New Zealand WES (TWA 0.2 ppm (0.38 mg/m³)); Taiwan PEL (TWA 0.2 ppm (0.38 mg/m³)); South Africa HCA OEL (TWA 0.4 ppm); France VLEP (TWA 0.5 ppm (0.96 mg/m³)); Germany TRGS 900 (TWA 0.5 ppm (0.96 mg/m³)); Ireland HSA (TWA 0.5 ppm (0.96 mg/m³)); Netherlands SER (TWA 0.5 ppm (0.96 mg/m³)); Sweden AV (TWA 0.5 ppm (0.96 mg/m³)); United Kingdom WEL (TWA 0.5 ppm (0.96 mg/m³)); 🇨🇦 British Columbia WorkSafeBC (Ceiling 1.0 ppm); Finland FIOH (TWA 2 ppm (3.8 mg/m³)); Chile DS 594 (TWA 2.6 ppm (4.9 mg/m³)); 🇨🇦 Ontario MOL (TWA 3.0 ppm); 🇨🇦 Quebec CNESST (TWA 3.0 ppm); Australia WES (TWA 3 ppm (5.6 mg/m³)); India Factories Act (TWA 3.0 ppm (6.0 mg/m³)); Kenya OEL (TWA 3 ppm (5 mg/m³)); Singapore PEL (TWA 3 ppm (5.6 mg/m³)); South Korea OEL (TWA 3 ppm (5.6 mg/m³)); Brazil NR-15 (Ceiling 4 ppm (7 mg/m³))

RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Initial Risk: CRITICAL -> Residual Risk: HIGH | Controls insufficient on step(s) 5.

Step	Description	Hazard	Controls	Initial Risk	Residual Risk
1	Recognize the perimeter overrun and account for personnel from available cover.	- Nighttime assault and low visibility impair recognition of incoming fire, terrain hazards, and movement of the 32-person unit. - Heavy small-arms fire and mortar impacts can cause penetrating trauma, blast injury, and fragmentation injuries.	- Use only existing cover identified by the unit leader - do not assume that vegetation - improvised barriers - or structures stop bullets or fragments.	**25 - Critical**	**15 - High**

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.

2	Move only when directed, using the leader-designated route through jungle terrain.	- Moving through jungle terrain at night during small-arms fire and mortar impacts exposes personnel to fire, fragmentation, trips, and falls. - Uncoordinated movement by a 32-person unit can cause separation, collisions, or entry into an unverified route.	- Use existing terrain or structures as cover only after the unit leader identifies them - no supplied detail confirms their protective capability. - Unit leader assigns movement order - route	**25 - Critical**	**15 - High**
3	Coordinate the danger-close airstrike through the authorized command channel.	- A danger-close airstrike near friendly positions creates risk of blast overpressure, fragmentation, structural or terrain debris, and fatal misidentification or friendly-fire injury. - Nighttime visibility and ongoing small-arms and mortar fire can impair location confirmation and communication.	- Use only existing cover selected by the unit leader - do not assume it can withstand an airstrike. No blast protection or shelter configuration is supplied. - Only the authorized military decision-maker requests - approves	**25 - Critical**	**15 - High**
4	Maintain essential communication and hearing protection during weapons fire and impacts.	- Small-arms and mortar fire and the airstrike produce extreme noise that can cause acute hearing injury and interfere with critical command communication. - Explosions may produce impulse noise beyond the protection provided by available hearing protectors.	- Use existing cover to reduce exposure only when the unit leader directs and its location does not increase other hazards - no noise-reduction performance is supplied. - Unit leader confirms a workable method for critical orders to be received and acknowledged - do not delay immediate protective action to obtain hearing protection. After the event	**20 - Critical**	**15 - High**
5	Limit avoidable exposure to smoke and combustion byproducts.	- Smoke and combustion byproducts from sustained weapons fire and nearby explosions may be inhaled, including carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, airborne combustion particles, and potentially lead-containing firearm emissions or residues. - The prompt does not establish the specific ammunition, combustion conditions, concentration, or duration of an individual's exposure.	- Use existing upwind or less smoke-affected cover if the unit leader can identify it without increasing exposure to fire - no ventilation system or verified clean-air location is supplied. - Unit leader observes for confusion - headache	**12 - High**	**12 - High** **WARNING**

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.

6	Restrict access and defer closeout until the affected area is assessed.	- After the assault and airstrike, unexploded or delayed explosive hazards and damaged terrain or debris may injure personnel moving through the affected jungle perimeter. - Smoke, poor visibility, and continued or changed combat conditions may conceal hazards and impede a reliable closeout.	- Establish a marked boundary around the area designated as hazardous by the responsible military authority - do not disturb suspected explosive items or debris. - Unit leader maintains accountability - restricts entry	**20 - Critical**	**15 - High**

Civilian risk levels: 1-4 Low, 5-9 Medium, 10-15 High, 16-25 Critical. Initial Risk = hazard risk before controls applied. Residual Risk = remaining risk after controls applied. Effective JHA demonstrates residual risk lower than initial risk on all steps.

Generated with JHA Rapid by Fouled Anchor Safety LLC. This document is AI-assisted and must be reviewed by a qualified safety professional before use. Not a compliance document.