OSHA COMPLIANCE JHA

Movie Hazard Analysis

TASK / OPERATION	LOCATION
Armed Threat Emergency Response	The Magnificent Seven (1960) — Village Siege Defense

JOB TITLE(S)

Hired gunman (6), Explosives Handler (1), Village Defender (20)

TASK / OPERATION DESCRIPTION

A group of hired gunmen and villagers fortify a small town against an armed raid, taking up positions on rooftops and behind cover while defending against gunfire, with one gunman rigging and detonating explosive charges.

DATE JHA PREPARED	SUPERVISOR(S)
Sep 24, 2026	*Not provided*

JHA TEAM MEMBERS

Not provided

STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS

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STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 1 Assess threat and prevent rooftop occupation Potential Injury: Fatal or life-altering gunshot injury; fatal or serious injury from a rooftop fall.	- Taking or moving between rooftop positions during the described armed raid exposes people to gunfire. - Rooftop access and movement may expose people to an unprotected edge or fall; roof condition, access route, and edge protection are unspecified.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Eliminate exposure by not sending anyone onto rooftops or into the threatened area and withdrawing from the site when feasible. Engineering controls (Existing?) - No defensible engineering control for active gunfire can be specified from the supplied details. Do not treat improvised cover as adequate protection. After responder release [ ] - a competent person must inspect the roof access route [ ] - walking-working surface [ ] - and available edge protection before any entry. [ ] Administrative controls - The person in charge must issue a stop-work and withdrawal instruction [ ] - notify emergency authorities [ ] - and account for personnel only when doing so does not increase exposure. No person may enter or re-enter until emergency responders direct or authorize access [ ] - changed conditions require responder or supervisor review. [ ] Personal protective equipment - No PPE can be specified as making exposure to armed gunfire acceptable. For responder-released roof inspection only - select fall-protection PPE after a competent person verifies roof configuration and anchorage details - which are currently unknown.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

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STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 2 Stop armed activity and account for personnel Potential Injury: Fatal or serious gunshot injury during crossfire, mistaken identification, or delayed withdrawal.	- Multiple people taking positions in the small town during an armed raid may mistake one another for a threat or enter another person's line of fire. - The group size of 27 and unspecified communication arrangements may delay accountability during withdrawal, prolonging exposure to gunfire.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Eliminate exposure by ending the armed activity and leaving the threatened area when feasible. Engineering controls (Existing?) - No suitable engineering control for crossfire or mistaken identification is established by the prompt [ ] - do not add or rely on improvised defensive positions. [ ] Administrative controls - The person in charge must communicate a stop-work and withdrawal message [ ] - account for the 27 people only when this can be done without increasing exposure [ ] - and report missing persons to emergency responders. Do not re-enter to locate anyone [ ] - use only responder-directed evacuation and accountability arrangements. [ ] Personal protective equipment - No PPE can be specified as protection adequate for gunfire - crossfire - or mistaken identification.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

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STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 3 Stop explosive-charge handling and withdraw Potential Injury: Fatal blast or fragment injuries, burns, traumatic amputation, or hearing injury.	- Rigging or detonating explosive charges creates blast, fragmentation, and unintended-initiation hazards; explosive identity and condition are unspecified. - Other people in the small town may be exposed to blast or fragments if they are near a charge or its effects.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Eliminate exposure by stopping handling and detonation and withdrawing people from the suspected hazard area. Engineering controls (Existing?) - No field-installed control can be specified without charge identity [ ] - location [ ] - condition [ ] - and initiation method. Do not approach to install barriers or attempt to isolate a suspected charge. [ ] Administrative controls - The person in charge must stop the activity [ ] - prevent re-entry [ ] - and notify emergency authorities that explosive charges may be present. Do not identify [ ] - disarm [ ] - move [ ] - inspect [ ] - or verify charges [ ] - only qualified emergency responders may assess and manage the hazard. [ ] Personal protective equipment - No PPE can be specified as protection adequate to justify approaching an unspecified explosive charge.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

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STEP	POTENTIAL HAZARDS	CONTROLS	PHOTOGRAPHS
Step 4 Defer re-entry, inspection, and closeout Potential Injury: Fatal or serious gunshot, blast, fragment, or fall injury.	- Re-entering before emergency responders establish that gunfire and explosive hazards are controlled may expose people to violence or an unexploded charge. - Post-event rooftop access may expose people to a fall if access, roof condition, and edge protection have not been assessed; these details are unspecified.	Can the potential hazard(s) be: - Eliminated? [ ] - Substituted/replaced? [ ] How? Eliminate exposure by deferring inspection, recovery, and cleanup while armed-threat or explosive status is uncertain. Engineering controls (Existing?) - No site-specific barrier or fall-protection system can be selected from the supplied details. Do not enter to install controls until emergency responders authorize access. After release [ ] - a competent person must assess roof access [ ] - walking surfaces [ ] - and available edge protection before workers enter. [ ] Administrative controls - The person in charge must keep personnel out pending responder release [ ] - record release restrictions [ ] - and obtain a competent-person assessment before any rooftop work. Stop and seek responder or supervisor review if damage [ ] - suspected explosives [ ] - armed-threat indicators [ ] - or scope changes are identified. [ ] Personal protective equipment - Do not select PPE until hazards are assessed after responder release and a separately authorized task-specific plan identifies the required equipment.	Uncontrolled No photo provided Controlled No photo provided

CHEMICAL EXPOSURE OEL SUMMARY (2)

OEL source priority: U.S. OSHA, NIOSH, ACGIH, and state sources first; then other available sources. The lowest available numeric OEL from matching offline sources is listed in addition to the location/default OEL. Confirm chemical identity and exposure limits against the SDS, label, and applicable regulations.

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Ethylene oxide (CAS: 75-21-8, confidence: 40%)

Detected as: The task explicitly involves people taking rooftop positions while gunfire is expected. Probability uses the supplied rare-job frequency and moderate exposure duration as a baseline, increased for direct exposure to armed fire. This describes imminent violence, not routine occupational work; this JHA must not be used to plan or authorize armed engagement. OSHA 29 CFR 1910 Subpart D Walking-Working Surfaces, sections 1910.28 and 1910.29, page: Data Unknown; application: fall protection, guardrail systems, and walking-working surface controls; assumption: the rooftop is an elevated walking-working surface and any later entry is authorized by emergency responders, exact applicability Data Unknown. Ethylene oxide is not identified or implied by the supplied task; OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1047 is not applicable on the information provided. Chemical identity, monitoring data, and exposure information: Data Unknown.
Location/default OEL: NIOSH REL Ceiling a TWA <0.1 ppm (0.18 mg/m3) C 5 ppm (9 mg/m3) [10-min/day] : [1910.1047] TWA 1 ppm 5 ppm [15-minute Excursion]
Lowest available OEL: 🇨🇦 British Columbia WorkSafeBC TWA 0.1 ppm
Sources cited: NIOSH REL (Ceiling a TWA <0.1 ppm (0.18 mg/m3) C 5 ppm (9 mg/m3) [10-min/day] : [1910.1047] TWA 1 ppm 5 ppm [15-minute Excursion]); Michigan MIOSHA (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Oregon OSHA (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Washington WISHA (TWA 1 ppm); 🇨🇦 British Columbia WorkSafeBC (TWA 0.1 ppm); New Zealand WES (TWA 0.1 ppm (0.2 mg/m³)); Netherlands SER (TWA 0.46 ppm (0.84 mg/m³)); Finland FIOH (TWA 0.5 ppm (0.9 mg/m³)); Chile DS 594 (TWA 0.9 ppm (1.58 mg/m³)); 🇨🇦 Ontario MOL (TWA 1.0 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); 🇨🇦 Quebec CNESST (TWA 1.0 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Australia WES (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); France VLEP (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Germany TRGS 900 (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Ireland HSA (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Japan JSOH (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Mexico NOM-010-STPS (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Russia SanPiN PDK (TWA 1 mg/m³); Singapore PEL (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); South Korea OEL (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Sweden AV (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); Taiwan PEL (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); United Kingdom WEL (TWA 1 ppm (1.8 mg/m³)); China GBZ (TWA 2 mg/m³); South Africa HCA OEL (TWA 2 ppm); Kenya OEL (TWA 5 ppm (10 mg/m³)); Brazil NR-15 (TWA 39 ppm (70 mg/m³))

Ethylene (CAS: 74-85-1, confidence: 40%)

Detected as: The task explicitly involves people taking rooftop positions while gunfire is expected. Probability uses the supplied rare-job frequency and moderate exposure duration as a baseline, increased for direct exposure to armed fire. This describes imminent violence, not routine occupational work; this JHA must not be used to plan or authorize armed engagement. OSHA 29 CFR 1910 Subpart D Walking-Working Surfaces, sections 1910.28 and 1910.29, page: Data Unknown; application: fall protection, guardrail systems, and walking-working surface controls; assumption: the rooftop is an elevated walking-working surface and any later entry is authorized by emergency responders, exact applicability Data Unknown. Ethylene oxide is not identified or implied by the supplied task; OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1047 is not applicable on the information provided. Chemical identity, monitoring data, and exposure information: Data Unknown.
Location/default OEL: 🇨🇦 British Columbia WorkSafeBC TWA 200.0 ppm
Lowest available OEL: 🇨🇦 British Columbia WorkSafeBC TWA 200.0 ppm
Sources cited: 🇨🇦 British Columbia WorkSafeBC (TWA 200.0 ppm); 🇨🇦 Ontario MOL (TWA 200.0 ppm); 🇨🇦 Quebec CNESST (TWA 200.0 ppm); Ireland HSA (TWA 200 ppm); Singapore PEL (TWA 200 ppm (226 mg/m³)); South Korea OEL (TWA 200 ppm (226 mg/m³)); Sweden AV (TWA 250 ppm (330 mg/m³))

RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Initial Risk: HIGH -> Residual Risk: HIGH | Risk reduction demonstrated across all steps.

Step	Description	Hazard	Controls	Initial Risk	Residual Risk
1	Assess threat and prevent rooftop occupation	- Taking or moving between rooftop positions during the described armed raid exposes people to gunfire. - Rooftop access and movement may expose people to an unprotected edge or fall; roof condition, access route, and edge protection are unspecified.	- No defensible engineering control for active gunfire can be specified from the supplied details. Do not treat improvised cover as adequate protection. After responder release - a competent person must inspect the roof access route - walking-working surface - and available edge protection before any entry.	**15 - High**	**10 - High**

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2	Stop armed activity and account for personnel	- Multiple people taking positions in the small town during an armed raid may mistake one another for a threat or enter another person's line of fire. - The group size of 27 and unspecified communication arrangements may delay accountability during withdrawal, prolonging exposure to gunfire.	- No suitable engineering control for crossfire or mistaken identification is established by the prompt - do not add or rely on improvised defensive positions. - The person in charge must communicate a stop-work and withdrawal message - account for the 27 people only when this can be done without increasing exposure	**15 - High**	**10 - High**
3	Stop explosive-charge handling and withdraw	- Rigging or detonating explosive charges creates blast, fragmentation, and unintended-initiation hazards; explosive identity and condition are unspecified. - Other people in the small town may be exposed to blast or fragments if they are near a charge or its effects.	- No field-installed control can be specified without charge identity - location - condition - and initiation method. Do not approach to install barriers or attempt to isolate a suspected charge.	**15 - High**	**10 - High**
4	Defer re-entry, inspection, and closeout	- Re-entering before emergency responders establish that gunfire and explosive hazards are controlled may expose people to violence or an unexploded charge. - Post-event rooftop access may expose people to a fall if access, roof condition, and edge protection have not been assessed; these details are unspecified.	- No site-specific barrier or fall-protection system can be selected from the supplied details. Do not enter to install controls until emergency responders authorize access. After release - a competent person must assess roof access - walking surfaces - and available edge protection before workers enter.	**15 - High**	**10 - High**

Civilian risk levels: 1-4 Low, 5-9 Medium, 10-15 High, 16-25 Critical. Initial Risk = hazard risk before controls applied. Residual Risk = remaining risk after controls applied. Effective JHA demonstrates residual risk lower than initial risk on all steps.

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